On Saturday, 25 May 1940, news reached Gort near Lille that the Germans had captured Calais as well as Boulogne. Reports were arriving at his room in the chateau at Prémesques that the Belgian Army was about to capitulate. The Germans had split the Belgian force and left it isolated from the British, who they must have heard had been evacuating men by sea for several days. For Gort, the Belgian capitulation would mean a 20-mile gap opening up on his left flank. Now came the most important moment in Gort’s career. At about six o’clock in the evening of 25 May, after sitting alone for a long time, he went next door to the office of his chief of staff, General Henry Pownall. Without preliminary discussion, he ordered him to move two British divisions from the south and ‘send them over to Brookie [General Alan Brooke] on the left’. There is no doubt that this decision, which went against his orders from the French, and from London, too, had come after much heart-searching. One of the men who knew him, Major General Sir Edward Spears, described Gort as ‘a simple, straightforward, but not very clever man’ and went on to say he was an ‘overdisciplined soldier who felt above all else that orders must be obeyed’
What Gort called a ‘hunch’ had come within an hour of a gap opening in the Belgian front line. Now it would be a matter of waiting to see whether the Germans could race through it before Gort’s two divisions could get there to plug the hole. For the French, Gort’s decision meant the end of any last hope for a counter-attack southward. For the BEF, it meant a chance of a fighting withdrawal. For Gort, it meant the end of his military aspirations – he would never again command an army in the field.
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Yet if one contemplates what the British government might have been forced by public pressure to do, in coming to terms with a Hitler holding captive a quarter of a million British soldiers, then Gort’s decision was a turning point in the war.