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Murf

murf@alexandria.the1977project.org

Joined 1 year, 10 months ago

"Why, yes, I am still upset that the Library of Alexandria burnt down"

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Murf has read 0 of 24 books.

Frederick Forsyth: The negotiator (1990, Bantam Books, Bantam) No rating

Easterhouse’s swindle was just a variation of the Fourth Cash Register scam, and would only be uncovered by the full annual Ministry audit the following spring. The fraud is based on the tale of the American bar-owner who, though his bar was always full, became convinced his take was 25 per cent less than it ought to be. He hired the best private detective, who took the room above the bar, bored a hole in the floor, and spent a week on his belly watching the bar below. Finally he reported: ‘I’m sorry to have to say this, but your bar staff are honest people. Every dollar and dime that crosses that bar-top goes into one of your four cash registers.’ ‘What do you mean – four?’ asked the bar-owner. ‘I only installed three.’

The negotiator by 

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

Soon after the fighting at Arras, a story circulated that Rommel had saved the day by using 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns in the antitank role for the first time ever. How this story gained currency is hard to imagine, for obviously the guns would have been virtually useless against armour unless they had already been supplied with Panzergranate (armour-piercing shells).

[...]

As early as the 1938–1939 Catalonian offensive in Spain’s civil war, the 8.8 cm guns had been towed into action behind the tanks, and it was estimated that over 90 per cent of their rounds were used against ground targets.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 299 - 300)

Anti-aircraft shells are explosive, they perform poorly against armour.

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

by the following day – 11 May – Gamelin began to realize that here, in the region of the Ardennes, was the Schwerpunkt of the German assault. Even so, the French command did not panic. They calculated the German advance in terms of French logistic achievement. The Germans would have to halt at the river Meuse. There they would regroup, bring up the artillery, and prepare for the river crossing. Gamelin ordered eleven French divisions to move to aid the threatened sector. He gave them top railway priority. It meant that the first elements of French support would arrive at the Meuse on 14 May, the last of them by 21 May. But by 13 May, the invaders, using road transport, were already at the Meuse and preparing to cross.

Blitzkrieg by 

It's a myth that the French were surprised by the attack - they were surprised by the speed.

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

In ideal weather Guderian’s highly trained armoured force used equipment designed to the scale of Western Europe. Never again in the Second World War were such factors to provide another chance for blitzkrieg.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 214)

Important to note the combination of terrain, geography, allied plans, army deployment and poor allied communications and response to changing realities all led to this remarkable victory. The axis saw the possibility and took it in an all or nothing gamble that only worked in that time, and that place.

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, German army group commander in both the Polish and Western campaigns, was one of the world’s foremost authorities on defensive warfare. In 1936 he wrote an article and later a book on the subject (Die Abwehr). ‘Operative defence’, he wrote, ‘must meet the threat of offensive by using the same weapons and the same means.’ It echoed what Colonel de Gaulle had already written in his book, but the French Army would not believe it.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 210)

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

Archibald Wavell, considered one of the finest of Britain’s generals, stressed the importance of such planning in a lecture on generalship in 1939. He said that strategy and tactics could be apprehended in a very short time by any reasonable human intelligence. But it was the principles and practice of military movement and administration – the ‘logistics’ of war – that was of prime importance. He went on: ‘I should like you always to bear in mind when you study military history or military events the importance of this administrative factor, because it is where most critics and many generals go wrong.’

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 190)

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

It is interesting in this connection to notice that, according to Liddell Hart, both German and British senior commanders agreed that German soldiers were more individualistic than their opponents. General von Blumentritt went so far as to complain of this, saying the Germans’ rank and file had too many ideas of their own and were not sufficiently obedient. However surprising this might be to British readers, studies of the desert fighting supported the contention that the German soldiers were better able to improvise in emergencies than their British opponents. Another finding was that British units commonly ceased fighting after losing all their officers, but Germans remained effectively organized right down to the last few NCOs.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 182)

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

Emphasis has already been given to the vital role that radio played in the technique of the blitzkrieg, but this importance was due entirely to the way in which German commanders were prepared to change plans minute by minute in the face of enemy opposition. It is extremely doubtful if such radio contact would have made much difference to the French or the British Army, which was trained to fight systematic set-piece battles.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 182)

The differing approaches of each side, the allies had the materiel and time to wait for a set piece battle, the Axis needed a quick victory.

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 1982, Ballantine Books) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

There was no teleprinter communication between the HQs and the army commanders. At Gamelin’s HQ there was not even a radio. Gamelin’s usual way of communicating with Georges was to go to him by car. Questioned about the lack of radio, Gamelin said it might have revealed the location of his HQ. Questioned about the speed with which he could get orders to the front, Gamelin said that it generally took forty-eight hours.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 116)

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

The low standard of the reservists was more indicative of the extent of France’s mobilization – one man in eight – than of the state of its regular army formations.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 112)

Informative point when looking at the performance of the French reserve divisions.

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

Flying home from his Anschluss triumph, Hitler had shown General Keitel how his mind was working. He put his hand across a small newspaper map of Europe so that his finger and thumb covered Germany and Austria. He nipped Czechoslovakia and then winked at Keitel.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 71)

Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg (Paperback, 2007, Pimlico) 5 stars

Deighton, author of SS-GB and other thrillers, turns to history again with this companion piece …

But as the war continued, it was Hitler’s political dogma that ensured the failure of his military aims. His worst military decisions – the refusal to let units withdraw to better positions, the obsession with towns that had strong psychological overtones (such as Leningrad and Stalingrad), and the political interference with the army – all these stemmed from his fears of political consequences. Politically motivated plans can be fatal to world conquest as to car factories.

Blitzkrieg by  (Page 64 - 65)

Yet war without politics is just destruction for the sake of destruction. The political gives it meaning.